{"id":102,"date":"2019-05-27T09:09:41","date_gmt":"2019-05-27T07:09:41","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/?p=102"},"modified":"2019-05-27T09:09:41","modified_gmt":"2019-05-27T07:09:41","slug":"kathi-beier-presents-a-working-paper-on-being-good-aristotelian-naturalism-and-the-naturalistic-fallacy","status":"publish","type":"post","link":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/2019\/05\/27\/kathi-beier-presents-a-working-paper-on-being-good-aristotelian-naturalism-and-the-naturalistic-fallacy\/","title":{"rendered":"Kathi Beier presents a working paper on &#8218;Being good: Aristotelian Naturalism and the naturalistic fallacy&#8216;"},"content":{"rendered":"\n<p>This is the first (and yet unfinished) draft of my contribution to a German anthology on the naturalistic fallacy in philosophy, logic and law. I first explain the two senses of the concept \u2018naturalistic fallacy\u2019 in philosophy, distinguishing between (i) G.E. Moore\u2019s claim that it is impossible to define \u2018good\u2019, and (ii) David Hume\u2019s suggestion that one cannot deduce ought-conclusions from is-premises. Based on that, I argue that Aristotelian Naturalism does not rest on a naturalistic fallacy in the Humean sense. It should, however, take Moore\u2019s claim more seriously. In order to do so, Aristotle\u2019s idea of \u2018good\u2019 as a transcendental term might be helpful.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":"<p>This is the first (and yet unfinished) draft of my contribution to a German anthology on the naturalistic fallacy in philosophy, logic and law. I first explain the two senses of the concept \u2018naturalistic fallacy\u2019 in philosophy, distinguishing between (i) G.E. Moore\u2019s claim that it is impossible to define \u2018good\u2019, and (ii) David Hume\u2019s suggestion &hellip; <a href=\"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/2019\/05\/27\/kathi-beier-presents-a-working-paper-on-being-good-aristotelian-naturalism-and-the-naturalistic-fallacy\/\" class=\"more-link\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">&#8222;Kathi Beier presents a working paper on &#8218;Being good: Aristotelian Naturalism and the naturalistic fallacy&#8216;&#8220; <\/span>weiterlesen<\/a><\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":2,"featured_media":0,"comment_status":"open","ping_status":"open","sticky":false,"template":"","format":"standard","meta":{"spay_email":""},"categories":[5],"tags":[87,91,89,90,88,14,92],"jetpack_featured_media_url":"","_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/102"}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/post"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/2"}],"replies":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/comments?post=102"}],"version-history":[{"count":1,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/102\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":103,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/posts\/102\/revisions\/103"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=102"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"category","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/categories?post=102"},{"taxonomy":"post_tag","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/projekte.uni-erfurt.de\/maxweberkolleg\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/tags?post=102"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}