This text is a slightly revised version of a chapter of my Ph.D.
dissertation, entitled Peirce on the Uses of History (defended: Humboldt
University, 2015). I am currently transforming the disssertation into a
book, which will be published by De Gruyter in 2020. It is about the
relation between philosophical understanding and historical knowledge
in Peirce’s work, and in pragmatism more broadly. The chapter I am
presenting here is the fifth. It deals with Peirce’s conception of
intersubjectivity and sociality, and on its implications for the argument
presented throughout the book. I present Peirce’s communitarian
understanding of science and philosophy, discuss his rather scattered
ideas about social and political philosophy, and also move a major
objection against him: in my view, Peirce has not reflected hard enough
on the differences between science and philosophy with regard to the
irreducibility of disagreement. I try to spell out some implications of this
criticism.
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